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Introduction
The political boundaries of a modern nation state form
the foundation for the study of economic policy making. Borders
represent the element that unifies and distinguishes a particular
economy. Within the prescribed perimeters, the movement of
labor, products, money, and the performance of services are
relatively unimpaired. They are uniformly governed by the
prevailing internal economic policies of the given nation. At
a border, however, a separate battery of economic policies
prevail. Border pOlicies are more diverse than those that
govern internal economic relations. Usually they are more
selfish. They are designed to restrict, or to limit, or to im-
pede both the flow of commerce and the movement of people unless
it is in the country's own self-interest to do otherwise.
International economic policies are often established on a basis
that reflects more political than economic considerations.
Of all the borders of the world none is more unique than
that which separates the countries of Mexico and the United
States. For no where within the community of nations does a
boundary separate two nations with greater economic disparity.
In 1970 the Gross National Product for the United States was
2over $974 billion; for Mexico it was $33 billion. The per capita
national income in the United States was approximately $4,300
while in Mexico it was slightly above $500. Thus, as One keen
observer of border economic affairs has written, "neither the
per capita gross national product nor the per capita income of
. any country in the world eve~comes near the amount of the
difference in per capita income between the United States and
Mexico."l
Living as neighbors with the reality of these vast dif-
ferences has led to the implementation of a number of policy
measures by both nations. The usual concern as to the impact
of these policies deals with the effect of one nation's actions
upon the welfare of the other. Scant attention is given to the
significance of border practices and pOlicies of each nation
upon its own people. In this instance, the concern is with the
policies and practices of the United States as they affect the
largely Chicano population that reside to the north of the 1,800
mile border with Mexico.
Background Considerations
As with every sector, the southwestern region of the United
States has its unique characteristics. The-rugged terrain and
the dry climate have given rise to a population pattern of
scattered oasis communities. Historically, the industrial base
of the region was built upon highly labor intensive work in
agriculture, ranching, mining, and railroading. Large corporate
3enterprises have been the rule. To meet their labor needs,
these corporate entities have aggressively sought to tap a variety
of sources of low wage, unskilled, and rightless workers.2
The first major immigration movement from Mexico occurred
during the period 1909-1930. During this period, roughly 750,000
Mexicans were legally admitted to the united States. Any mass
migration of people is caused by both "push" and "pull" forces.
In this case, the "push" was the violence of the Mexican Revo-
lutionary War (1910-1919) and the "pull" was the labor shortages
in the Southwest due to events associated with World War I.
Immigration from Asia had been curtailed earlier by the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Gentleman's Agreement with Japan
of 1907. Moreover, the mass Waves of European immigrants ceased
with the outbreak of World War I and the temporary immigration
restrictions imposed by the United States in 1921 which became
permanent with the National Origins Act of 1924. Immigrants
from Mexico, however, were excluded from the coverage of this
Act. Indeed,legal immigrationfrom Mexico was no~~
1\
until 1968 when it was included within the 120,000 immigrants
a year allowed from Western Hemisphere nations. It is estimated
that the total legal immigration of Mexicans to the United
. 3States since 1900 has been about 1.4 million people.
The flood of Mexican immigrants was interrupted with the
onset of the Great Depression. In fact, it was officially
reversed through a policy of forced repatriation of many Mexicans
4who had not officially filed and completed their immigration and
1 " 4natura 1zat1on papers. The justification for this action was
that unemployment was high and, with a plentiful supply of
Anglos who had been dispossessed of their small land holdings in
the "dust bowl" to meet the demand for cheap laborers, the
Mexicans were seen as a redundancy. The fact that some Mexicans
had married American citizens and that some had children born
in this country was not considered important by government
officials. Policy makers were concerned with political expe-
diency, not principle. Subsequent border policies have continued
to reflect this basic theme to this day.
By the 1940's, the economic situation had changed markedly.
The military requirements of the nation and its related manu-
facturing needs led to a labor shortage in the agricultural
sector. The growers of the Southwest had foreseen these devel-
opments prior to the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. As a result,
they made two fateful decisions: first, the pool of cheap
labor of Mexico was to be tapped to fill the manpower deficit
and, secondly, the agencies of t~e Federal govexnment were to be
the vehicle of deliverance.5
The Braceros
Although the initial requests of the growers were denied
by the Federal government in 1941, they were favorably received
by mid-1942. Mexico, however, balked at first at the proposal
for a formal inter-government agreement. The Mexican economy
5was flourishing; there were fears of Mexican workers being drafted;
there were the bitter memories of the repatriation drive of the
1930's; and there was the knowledge of the discriminatory treat-
ment accorded people of Mexican ancestry throughout the Southwest.
The unregulated hiring of Mexican citizens by foreign nations
had been prohibited by Article 123 of the Constitution of 1917.
Lengthy negotiations between the two governments resulted
in a formal agreement in August, 1942. The Mexican Labor Program,
better known as the "bracero program," was launched. Workers
were to be afforded numerous protections with respect to housing,
transportation, food, medical needs, and wage rates. Initiated
through appropriations to P.L. 45, the program was extended by
subsequent enactments until 1947.
For the growers the bracero program was a "bonanza.,,6
Braceros were limited exclusively to agricultural work. Any
bracero who found a jOb in another industry was subject to
immediate deportation. The significance of the program for
Chicanos is obvious: the agricultural labor market of the South-
west was removed from competition with the non-agricultural sector.
Although braceros were not supposed to depress wage rates, the
program clearly had this effect. Initially, the program was
under the control of the Farm Security Administration who ad-
ministered the program to the letter. But in July, 1943,
supervision was shifted to the grower-dominated War Food Admin-
istration. Many of the protections were no longer enforced.
6Mexico, in fact, banned the braceros from working in Texas in
1943. Illegal entrants, for whom not even nominal protections
were provided, filled the Texas vacuum.
When the agreement ended December 31, 1947, the program
was continued informally and unregulated until 1951. In that
year, again under the cloak of war-related labor shortages, the
bracero program was formalized into P.L. 7B. Texas was included
in the new program. It continued to function until it was ter-
, minated on December 31, 1964.
Although some defense of the program may be offered as a
wartime emergency program, it is clear from a review
~
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program is a classic example of how national border pOlicies
have adversely affected the native Chicano population. The.
bracero program seriously disrupted the labor exchange process
in rural labor markets. The relative wages of agricultural
workers in the Southwest declined sharply during the program's
life. Under such circumstances, any claim that a domestic labor
shortage existed can only be dismissed as being an artificial
1 " 7creation of man-made po 1C1es. Of equal significance, however,
was the symbolic indifference that the federally sanctioned
program manifested toward the welfare of Chicanos.B
7Illegal Entrants
Parallelling the bracero years and succeeding them after
its termination has been the flow of illegal entrants into the
Southwest labor markets. The problem has existed for decades.
Unfortunately, illegal entry is regarded largely as a regional
issue despite the epidemic proportions it had assumed in the late
1960's and early 1970's (see Appendix A). As one knowledgeable
observer has written in 1972:
A succession of recent national administrations
have been peculiarly indifferent, even resistant,
toward examining, much less changing, a situation
that persistently mocks national immigration policies.
The scope of the problem can be summed in one statistic:
from 1939 through 1969, a period during which 7.4
million persons legally immigrated to the United
States from countries allover the world, more than
7.4 million Mexican nationals entered the country un-
lawfullY9and were apprehended and expatriated to
Mexico.
. No one, of course, knows the actual number of illegal aliens
who cross annually into the United States. Figures are available
only for those apprehended. It is reliably estimated that for
every illegal alien apprehended in the United States, another
10has gone undetected. The Commissioner of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) observed in 1971 that the upward
trend in illegal entry "has grown progressively worse" and
predicted for the future that "border violations continue to
11
mount."
Given the economic disparity between the two nations, it is
not surprising that thousands of Mexicans annually seek to enter
8the nation illegally. It is, however, disconcerting that public
policy is so tolerant of this hemorrhage of the border; so timid
in the application of existing law; and so hesitant to assume
a posture of deterrance.
As a concession to Texas agricultural interests, the existing
immigration statutes contain the "Texas proviso." This section
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 states that emploYment
and the related services provided by employers to employees
(i.e., transportation, housing, or feeding) does not constitute
an illegal act of harboring an illegal alien. The intent of
the "proviso" is to make employers immune from prosecution if
they hire such workers. Even employers whose premises are
raided regularly by the INS are very rarely prosecuted. It is
certainly conceivable that INS could adopt regulations that would
obligate employers to at least inquire as to the citizenship
status of persons they suspect as being illegal aliens. To
date INS has elected not to do so.
One of the problems associated with recognition of an illegal
alien by an employer is the easy availability of social security
cards. In 1966, the INS formally requested that the Social
Security Administration (SSA) include a question in their appli-
cation forms asking: "Are you a citizen, yes or no?" If the
answer was "no", the application was to be referred to the INS
for a formal determination of the immigration status of the indi-
vidual. The SSA rejected the proposal.12 It claimed that the
9social security card is used only to identify data and that there
is no legal authority for the refusal to issue a card to an
applicant who has completed the prescribed form. Commenting
bitterly over the incongruity of action between SSA and INS,
the California Court of Appeals stated in 1970 that: "In a
continuing display of incredible insularity, one agency of government
puts its foot in the door which another agency is striving
vainly to close."13
For those aliens who are apprehended, over 95 percent are
simply returned to Mexico by the most expedient form of trans-
portation at the expense of the Federal government. Less that
5 percent of the illegal Mexican nationals are subjected to
formal deportation proceedings by the INS which would render a
future entry as a felony offense.14 More numerous prosecutions
could serve as a deterrent. Neither the Congress nor the
President, it appears, believe the issue warrants a sufficient
increase in the number of hearing officers to raise significantly
the level of prosecutions. As a result, those aliens allowed
to leave informally are in no way deterred fr.omreturning at
will. For all intents and purposes, they are encouraged to
re-enter whenever they please.
Thus, the situation is one in which if an illegal alien is
caught, he is simply returned to his native land; if he is not
apprehended, he works at a job which affords him an income
higher than his alternatives at home. For the businessman,
10
there is no risk of loss.
.
There are only profitable gains to be
had from tapping a cheap source of labor that is completely
beholden to arbitrary terms of employment set by the employer.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 expressly
states that it is national policy to preserve available job
opportunities for the domestic labor force. In 1970, a
California Court of Appeals decision stated that the number of
illegal aliens employed in the Southwest "represents an abject
failure of national policy." Moreover, the Court observed
that the lack of meaningful corrective action "must be ascribed
15to self-imposed impotence of our national government."
It is the powerless Chicano population of the Southwest who
bear the major burden of this "self-imposed impotence" of public
policy. The reluctance by government to alter the status quo
is best understood in terms of the benefits received by the
powerful employer interests of the region.
The Commuters
Yet of all the border policies, none is more unique than
those governing commuters. David North has aptly observed that
"the commuter is this generation's bracero.,,16 The commuters
are people who live in Mexico but who frequently seek employment
in the united States. They mayor may not be United States
citizens. Until 1921, there were no restrictions on immigrants
who wished to come and to work in the United States. Aliens
were free to be employed with only minor exceptions. In 1921,
11
temporary restrictions on immigration were imposed. These cul-
minated in the adoption of the National Origins Act of 1924
which established an official immigration policy. Although
natives of the Western Hemisphere were excluded from the quotas
imposed by the Act, all people entering the United States were
required to be classified as either "immigrant" or "non-immigrant."
"Immigrants" were defined as all entrants except those designated
as "non-immigrants" who are visiting the country temporarily
"for business or pleasure. II
For a short interval workers who lived in Mexico but
commuted to jobs in the united States were classified as "non-
immigrant visitors" who were free to cross the border "'forbusiness."
By arbitrary administrative decision by the INS in 1927, however,
the status of these people was changed to "immigrants." Sub-
sequently in 1929, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the INS
decision (Karuth v. Albro) with the famous ruling that "employment
equals residence" (thereby neatly avoiding the permanent re-
sidency requirement of the immigration statutes).
One category of commuters are popularly called "green-
carders" (so named after the original color of the identification
cards they carry). These card holders are classified as immi-
grants. As such they can move at will and work anywhere within
the United States. There are, however, several differences
between a green-carder and other permanent resident immigrants.
Namely, green-carders are not required to reside within the
12
country; they may not be unemployed for more than six months
without losing their immigration classification; they may not
serve as strikebreakers; and they cannot count the time they
live outside the United States toward their five years needed
to be eligible to apply for citizenship. In reality, these
differences are not of consequence. The unemployment restriction
is not enforced; the anti-strikebreaker rule is so easily
circumvented that it is essentially meaningless; and many green-
' b ' Am
,
't '
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carders have no interest 1n ecom1ng er1can C1 1zens.
The second group of commuters are known as "white-carders"
(similarly called because of the original color of their border
, crossing passes). These people are "legal visitors" who can
stay in the United States for up to 72 hours within a radius
of 25 miles of the border. Officially, white-carders are forbidden
to be employed. Until January, 1969, the validity of a white
card was limited to four years from the date of issuance.
Since then, the restriction has been removed so that there is no
expiration date. The reason for the change by the INS was that
18the renewal procedure was too costly. Hence, within the 25
mile border radius, there is absolutely no way to know how long
a white-carder is actually in the country. If a white-carder
indicates when he crosses the border that he plans to travel
beyond the 25 mile limit, a date of entry is stamped on the
card. In fact, however, this procedure is frequently circum-
vented. For once a white-carder crosses the border he simply
13
mails the card back to Mexico and then proceeds to go beyond
the 25 mile limit for as long as he wants. If, by chance, he
is apprehended, he simply claims he is an illegal entrant,
agrees to a voluntary departure, and is returned to Mexico with
no record made of his violation of the law. When he returns
to Mexico, his white card is waiting for him so that the entire
cycle may then be repeated.19
Exactly how many green and white-carders there are is
somewhat of a mystery. A 1969 study reported that 70,000
workers crossed the southern border daily.20 Of these, 20,000
were American citizens and 50,000 were green-carders. How
many additional seasonal green-carders there are is unknown.
It is estimated in 1972 that there were 3.7 million green-carders
(of whom 735,018 were Mexicans) in the entire United States.2l
The controversy, however, is not with green-carders per
~
but rather with those who work in the United States but live
permanently or part-time in Mexico. These green-carders are
often willing to work for wages and under employment conditions
that are impossible for a person who must confront the cost of
living in the United States on a full-time basis. Moreover,
there is ample evidence that many commuting green-carders do not
pay income tax and that they do not register with the Selective
. d 22Service as requ~re. As for white-carders, the INS reports
that over 2.2 million cards were issued in the Southwest region
23between 1960 and 1969. How many of these white-carders have
14
abused their visiting privileges by seeking employment is un-
known. The fact that the statistics on green and white-carders
are either so vague or completely unknown has been labeled"
"astonishing" by the comprehensive 1970 UCLA Mexican-American
P . t 24Study rOJec.
In 1952, the Secretary of Labor was empowered to block the
entry of immigrants from Mexico if their presence would endanger
prevailing labor standards. The Immigration Act of 1965 signi-
ficantly increased this power by requiring that immigrants who
are job seekers receive a labor certification. As one pre-
condition for receipt of a green card, a certification must be
made that a labor shortage exists in the occupation for which
the immigrant seeks employment and that his presence will not
adversely affect prevailing wages and working conditions. The
certification procedure was effective July 1, 1968. The certi-
fication is made only ~ -- at the time that the immigrant
makes initial application for entry. The certification procedure,
however, is fraught with loopholes. North estimates that only
one of every 13 workers seeking to become immigrants is subject
to the certification process.25
The current legal status of green-carders has corne into
serious question. As the commuter status does not have a statutory
authority, the concept has evolved through years of INS adrnin-
istrative interpretations. Greene indicates that the prevailing
INS regulations limit the re-entry rights of a green-carder to
15
an individual who is "returning to an unrelinquished lawful
26permanent address." Before 1965, INS reasoned that any commuter
I
who had been accorded the "privilege of residing permanently"
was always entitled to enter the country. The Immigration Act
of 1965, however, altered the statutory language under which the
INS had allowed virtually unrestricted movement of commuting
green-carders. The amended language restricted informal entry
to "an immigrant lawfully admitted for permanent residence who
is returning from a temporary visit abroad." Thus, Greene
asserts:
No distortion of the English language could result
in a finding that the commuter was entering the
United States after a temporary visit abroad to
return to his principal, actual dwelling place.
Rather, the commuter was simply leaving his ~9reign
home and entering the United States to work.
Thus, Greene concludes that since 1965 the commuting green-
carders are "not merely lacking in statutory authority" but
that the practice is "actually prohibited.,,28 If this is
true, the obvious question is why has the INS allowed the
practice to continue unabated? Greene theorizes that the com-
plexities associated with terminating the entry privilege to
1 . 29so many thousands of people is an exp anat~on. Another
plausibility is that the INS has decided to.continue the commuters
as a substitute for the terminated bracero program.30 For many
thousands of commuters, the green and the white cards have
. both become a sub rosa work permit for thousands of Mexican
--
workers who have no intention of ever living in the United States.
16
To date, litigation has only added to the confused status
of the green card. In a court suit filed by two California
farm workers in 1969 to bar the entry of commuters under the
new language of the Act of 1965, the Court refused to set aside
the accumulated history of the commuter practice since the new
language of the Act did not specifically ban commuting.3l
In the aforementioned court case, the decision not to act
affirmatively to end the commuter status made mention of what
is probably the major factor that explains the perpetuation of
this pOlicy charade. Namely, the court mentions the fear that
such a ban may have adverse foreign pOlicy consequences.32
For the u.s. Department of State has consistently contended
that any interruption in the commuter program would seriously
harm relations between Mexico and the united States. Former
Secretary of State Dean Rusk has testified before Congress that
the border towns of the two nations "have grown into single
economic communities" and that "a disruption in the life of
these communities would do real harm to good neighbor relations
in the area.,,33 If it is really true that it is the official
policy of the United States to consider these border towns ~s
"single economic communities," there are certainly more humane
and substantive ways to manifest this policy than by simply
encouraging poor Mexicans to make poor Chicanos even poorer.
The sanction given to commuters merely means that the Chicano
population must compete directly with these commuters. The
17
result is that employment opportunities are lost; wages are kept
low; union organization efforts are hampered; and seasonal
migratory farm labor becomes a prime alternative occupation
for Chicano workers.34 As a consequence, Schmidt has observed:
The United States worker who competes with the
traffic of workers from Mexico is caught in a situation
where he pays a substantial part of what the Secretary'
of State regards as a form of foreign aid to a
neighbornig nation.35
As an official of the Texas Employment Commission in Laredo,
Texas, lamented in 1972:
The commuter system is continued largely because
of the attitude of the U.S. Department of State which
wants good relations with Mexico. Needless to say,
this relationship is m~~ntained at a terrible human
cost to our citizenry.
There can be no justification for the perpetuation of the
commuter system. If it is desirable to provide foreign aid to
the border economies of Mexico, then let it be above the table
and let it be an honest payment of dollars directly in the form
of developmental assistance. But to justify the commuter system
on the 'basis that it represents a form of foreign aid is a
manifestation of insensitivity to the value of human life.
Policies that are economically unjust are morally wrong; and,
policies that are morally wrong cannot be politically right.
The "Twin Plants" Program
To complete a discussion of the current status of United
States pOlicies that have a serious detrimental impact on the
predominately Chicano population of the United States, mention
18
must be also made of the "twin plants" program. It represents
another example whereby the administrative and institutional
practices of the United States governrnenthavebecome an instrument
of oppression for Chicanos.
The "twin plants" program is the situation whereby a free-
trade zone was established by Mexico that extends 12 1/2 miles
in from the border along its entire 1,800 mile length. The
United States enters the picture via its tariff policies.
Sections 806.30 and 807 of the tariff code of the U.S'. Customs
Regulations require that import duties need only be assessed to
the "value added" to products assembled from component parts
-ZOo
originally made in the United States that are exported ~ a
foreign country and imported back into the united States (hence,
the name "twin plants"). In the present case, it is the assembly
process that is done in Mexico. As a rule, it is essentially
wages that represent the "value added." As the hourly wage
along the border averages less tha~ fifty cents an hour, there
is a considerable saving to the manufacturing firms involved.
Mexico, in turn, does not apply any duty on these exports.
The free trade zone was established by Mexico under its
Border Industries Program (la programa de Industrializacion
Fronterizo) in 1965. Ostensibly, the reason for the need for
such a program was the high unemploYment in the northern states
of Mexico due to the termination of the bracero program in
December, 1964. Participation in the program by United States
19
firms accelerated after the U.S. Tariff Commission reviewed
the entire program in 1970 and gave the undertaking its
bl . 37explicit ess1ng.
The "twin plants" program is a contradiction to the espoused
border development strategy of Mexico. Rather than reduce
Mexico's dependence upon the United States (as outlined in 1960
in its National Frontier Program -- PRONAF), the "twin plants"
program has increased the dependence. In addition, although
the program was set up to meet the needs of unemployed males,
38
over 80 percent of those employed in the program are women.
It is easy to understand why Mexico would undertake such
a venture -- even if it does conflict with its own long range
development objectives. There are jobs and foreign exchange
to be gained. It is not clear, however, why the United States
should encourage such an undertaking through its own tariff
pOlicies without offering the slightest form of compensation to
its own citizens whose opportunities for economic development
are purposely retarded by the program. In many areas along
the United States side of the border, there exists an available
labor supply and working conditions that, relative to the rest
of the country, should make the region a natural industrial
magnet. The fact that the region is, instead, one of the most
economically depressed areas in the nation is positive proof
that something is awry. The tariff policies that give special
preference to products assembled in Mexico are part of the
20
explanation for this perpetuation of this regional poverty.
For the possible economic advantage. that might be offered for
firms to locate in one of the border communities on the United
States side is always nullified by the even greater economic
advantage of locating on the Mexican side. Thus, Chicanos
must witness "the purposeful sacrifice of numerous chances
for economic development, industrial diversification, and
employment opportunities in their own home region" with the
39
official approval of their own Federal government.
Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, citizens of the
United States who are adversely affected by their own
government's trade concessions are eligible for special training
and relocation allowances if the U.S. Tariff Commission makes
such a determination. To date, the Commission has not made any
such ~ruling in this case although it is obvious as to the need
to do so. Thus, the "twin-plants" arrangement must join the
already lengthy list of policies that stifle opportunities for
Chicano advancement.
Concluding Observations
The picture that emerges from the preceding review of the
border policies of the United States is strikingly clear: it
is one of absolute insensitivity to the economic impact of these
pOlicies on the largely Chicano population who overwhelmingly
dominate the twenty-four counties that comprise the northern
side of the international boundary. It is when all of these
21
separate practices and policies are examined collectively that
the unmistakable pattern of malevolence is seen. All of the
policies and practices are justified as either being beneficial
to the large corporate interests' of the southwestern united
States or as being necessarily desirable in the interest of good
foreign relations with Mexico. In none of these is there an
iota of consideration for the impact of these endeavors on the
Chicano population of the border region. In every instance,
Chicanos are made worse off by the policies of their own
government. There is no consolation in the retort that the gains
received by others may counterbalance these losses by Chicanos.
A resort to averaging the impact of policies is impossible
when human welfare is involved.
If it is desirable to have good relations with our neighbor
Mexico -- which I firmly believe it is -- there is no reason
why Chicanos should suffer in the process. If financial assis-
tance is necessary, let the aid take the form of massive,
direct cash grants. If the United States has the funds to
consider making extensive reparation paYments to North Vietnam;
to explore the barren moon and the endless universe beyond; and
to stockpile military weaponry of every description that is
capable of destroying the earth a thousand times over, it
certainly has the ability to provide the wherewithal for Mexico
to develop its own northern economy. If Mexico does not want
such aid, so be it. But it should be manifestly clear that
22
a continuation of the existing state of affairs is absolutely
out of the question. Illegal entry must be stopped by expanded
enforcement, prosecution of offenders, and a sweep of the labor
markets to return those already here; criminal penalties should
be adopted for u.s. employers who hire illegal entrants; the
commuter system must be terminated forthwith; and the tariff
provisions that encourage the "twin plants" arrangement repealed.
There are proper ways to conduct good international relations,
but they include none of the sneaky and inhumane endeavors that
presently exist. For the foundation of the existing policies
is the impoverishment of hundreds of thousands of Chicanos.
, No public policies of any nation deserve respect nor should they
be allowed to persevere when they are based upon such unjust
premises and they bear such despicable results.
23
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Year
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
Source:
APPENDIX A
Number of
Mexican Braceros
Illegal Entrants
Returned to Mexico
4,203
52,098
62,170
120,000
82,000
55,000
35,345
107,000
67,500
192,000
197,100
201,380
309,033
398,650
445,197
436,049
432,857
437,643
315,846
291,420
194,978
186,865
177,736
20,286
8,647
7,703
0
0
0
0
10,603
16,154
39,449
80,760
116,320
214,543
193,852
289,400
469,581
510,355
531,719
839,149
1,035,282
165,186
58,792
45,640
45,164
42,732
39,750
39,860
41,200
51 , 23 0
41,589
48,948
89,683
107,695
142,520
189,572
265,539
348,000
U.S. Department of Labor and the Immi-
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